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Abstract
A certificateless signature retains the efficiency of
Shamir’s identity-based signature while it does not suf-
fer from the inherent private key escrow problem, which
is first introduced by S. Al-Riyami and K. Paterson in
Asiacrypt 2003. In this paper, we proposed a new certifi-
cateless signature scheme based on bilinear pairings. The
proposed scheme is more efficient than those of previous
schemes by pre-computing the pairing e(P, P ) = g and
publishing as the system parameters, it needs not to com-
pute the pairing in the Sign stage, and only needs to com-
pute three pairings in the Verify stage. In addition, the
proposed scheme does not need the special MaptoPoint
hash function and the confidential channel between KGC
and users. The proposed scheme is unforgeable under the
hardness assumption of the q-strong Diffie-Hellman prob-
lem and Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
Keywords: Bilinear Pairings, Certificateless Signature, q-
Strong Diffie–Hellman Problem
1 Introduction
A digital signature is one of the most important secu-
rity primitives in modern cryptography. In a traditional
public key signature scheme, methods to guarantee the
authenticity of a public key are required, since the public
key of the signer is actually a type of random string. To
provide the binding between a signer and his public key,
the traditional public key signature uses a certificate that
is a digitally signed statement issued by the CA (Certifi-
cation Authority). The need for public key infrastructure
(PKI) supporting certificates is considered the main dif-
ficulty in the deployment and management of public key
signature schemes.
First proposed by Shamir [10], identity-based public
key cryptography tackles the problems of authenticity of
keys in a different way to traditional PKI. The identity-
based signature scheme can dispense with certificates,
the key escrow of a user’s private key is inherent in the
identity-based signature scheme [3, 5, 7]. A trusted third
party called the PKG (Private Key Generator) manages
the generation and distribution of the users’ private keys.
In Asiacrypt 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced
and made concrete the concept of certificateless public key
cryptography [9]. A certificateless signature scheme does
not require the use of certificates and yet does not have the
inherent key escrow problem of the identity-based signa-
ture scheme [8, 12]. Unlike the PKG in an identity-based
signature scheme, the KGC (Key Generating Center) in
a certificateless signature scheme does not have access to
the user’s private key. The KGC derives a partial private
key from the user’s identity and the master key. The user
then combines the partial private key with some secret
information to generate the actual private signing key.
The system is not identity-based, because the public key
is no longer computable from a user identity. However,
no authentication of the public key is necessary and no
certificate is required.
In this paper, we proposes a new certificateless signa-
ture scheme based on bilinear pairings. The proposed
scheme is more efficient than those of previous schemes
by pre-computing the pairing e(P, P ) = g and publishing
as the system parameters, thus it need not to compute
the pairing in the Sign stage, and only need to com-
pute three pairings in the Verify stage. In addition, the
proposed scheme does not need the special MaptoPoint
hash function. Finally, we proved the proposed scheme
is unforgeable under the hardness assumption of the q-
strong Diffie–Hellman problem and Computational Diffie-
Hellman problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we describe background concepts on bilinear pair-
ings and related mathematical problems. In Section 3, we
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present a new certificateless signature scheme. The secu-
rity and efficiency analysis are given in Section 4. Finally,
we conclude the paper with Section 5.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Bilinear Pairings
Bilinear pairing is an important cryptographic primitive.
Let (G1, +) and (G2, ·) be two cyclic groups of the same
prime order q. The bilinear pairing is a map e : G1×G1 →
G2, which satisfies the following properties:
• Bilinear: e(aP, bQ) = e(P, Q)ab for all P, Q ∈ G1
and a, b ∈ Z∗q .
• Non-degenerate: If P is a generator of G1, then
e(P, P ) is a generator of G2. In other words,
e(P, P ) 6= 1G2 .
• Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to
compute e(P, Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
Typically, the map e will be derived from either Weil
or Tate pairing on a elliptic curve over a finite field.
2.2 Diffie-Hellman Problems
We also introduce here the computational problems that
will form the basis of security for the proposed certificate-
less signature scheme.
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two
group elements P and Q in G1, find an integer n, such
that Q = nP whenever such an integer exists.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP):
For any a, b ∈ Z∗q , given (P, aP, bP ), compute abP .
Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP): For
any a, b, c ∈ Z∗q , given (P, aP, bP, cP ), decide whether
c = ab mod q.
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) Group: We define G1 as
a GDH group if G1 is a group such that DDHP can be
solved in polynomial time, but no algorithm can solve
CDHP with non-negligible advantage within polynomial-
time.
The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem (q-SDHP):
Given a (q + 2)-tuple
(P, Q, αQ, α2Q, · · · , αqQ), find a pair (c, (c + α)−1P )
with c ∈ Z∗q .
3 An Efficient Certificateless Sig-
nature Scheme
At the AsiaCrypt 2003 conference, Al-Riyami and Pater-
son introduced and made concrete the concept of certifi-
cateless public key cryptography, a model for the use of
public key cryptography which avoids the inherent escrow
of identity-based cryptography and yet does not require
certificates to guarantee the authenticity of public keys.
Since then, several certificateless signature shcemes were
presented [8, 12]. In this section, we propose a new cer-
tificateless signature scheme from bilinear pairings.
A certificateless signature scheme is a 7-tuple of
polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Partial-Private-
Key-Extract, Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key,
Set-Public-Key, Sign, Verify), where Setup and
Partial-Private-Key-Extract are performed by a
KGC. Since Set-Secret-Value, Set-Private-Key, and
Set-Public-Key are executed by a user, the key escrow
of the user’s private key is not inherent in a certificateless
signature scheme. The detailed descriptions of the
proposed certificateless signature scheme are depicted as
follows.
Setup:
This algorithm takes as input a security parameter k and
returns the system parameters and master key. More spe-
cially, this algorithm runs as follows. Let G1 be a cyclic
additive group generated by P , whose order is a prime q,
G2 be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q,
and e : G1 ×G1 → G2 be a bilinear pairing.
1) Choose s ∈R Z∗q and set Ppub = sP and compute
g = e(P, P ).
2) Choose cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
Z∗q and H2 : {0, 1}∗ ×G2 → Z∗q .
3) Set the system parameters as
{G1, G2, q, P, Ppub, g, H1,H2} and keep the master
key s secret.
The system parameters are distributed to the users of
the system through a secure authenticated channel.
Partial-Private-Key-Extract:
This algorithm takes as input the system parameters, the
master key, and an identifiable information and returns
its corresponding partial private key. More formally, to
construct the partial private key for Alice with identifiable
information IDA, we adopt the blind technique as in [11]
to remove the requirement of confidential and authentic
channel between Alice and KGC in this stage.
1) Alice chooses a value k ∈R Z∗q to compute kP , then
Alice sends his identity IDA and kP to the KGC.
2) KGC checks that Alice has a claim to a particular
online identifier IDA. If they do, the KGC computes
D′IDA = (H1(IDA) + s)
−1P + s(kP ), then sends it
to Alice through an open channel.
3) Alice computes DIDA = D
′
IDA
− k(sP ) =
(H1(IDA) + s)−1P .
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Alice KGC
k ∈R Z∗q
IDA ‖ kP
IDA ‖ kP−−−−−−−→
D′IDA =
(H1(IDA) + s)−1P
+s(kP )
D′IDA←−−−
DIDA
= D′IDA − kPpub
= (H1(IDA) + s)−1P
Anyone else cannot get Alice’s private key un-
less he can get ksP from kP and sP , which is a
hard CDH problem. Alice can get his private key
by D′IDA − kPpub because k is chosen by himself.
Notice that Alice can verify the correctness of the
Partial-Private-Key-Extract algorithm output by
checking that e(DIDA ,H1(IDA)P + Ppub) = g.
Set-Secret-Value:
This algorithm takes as input the system parameters and
an identifiable information and returns its corresponding
secret value. More specially, to set the secret value for
Alice, choose xA ∈R Z∗q , and output xA as her secret
value.
Set-Private-Key:
This algorithm takes as input the system parame-
ters, a partial private key, and a secret value and
returns corresponding private key. More specially,
to construct the private key for Alice, compute
SKIDA = xADIDA = xA(H1(IDA) + s)
−1P as her
private key.
Set-Public-Key:
This algorithm takes as input the system parameters
and a secret value and outputs corresponding public
key. More specially, to construct the public key for
Alice, compute XA = x−1A P , YA = x
−1
A Ppub, and set
PKIDA =< XA, YA > as her public key.
Sign:
Given a message m and a private key SKIDA , perform
the following steps.
1) Choose a ∈R Z∗q .
2) Compute r = ga ∈ G2.
3) Set v = H2(m ‖ r) ∈ Z∗q .
4) Compute U = (a + v)SKIDA ∈ G1.
5) Set σ = (U, v) ∈ G1 × Z∗q as the signature of the
message m.
Verify:
To verify a signature σ = (U, v) of a message m for Alice
with public key PKIDA =< XA, YA >, this algorithm
runs as follows.
1) Check whether or not the equality e(XA, Ppub) =
e(YA, P ) holds. If not, stop and reject the signature.
Otherwise, continue.
2) Compute r = e(U,H1(IDA)XA + YA)g−v
3) Check if v = H2(m ‖ r) holds. If it does, accept the
signature. Otherwise, stop and reject the signature.
This completes the description of our proposed certifi-
cateless signature scheme. In the following section, we
analyze the scheme from performance and security points
of view.
4 Analysis of the Proposed Cer-
tificateless Signature Scheme
4.1 Correctness Analysis
Consistency of the proposed scheme is satisfied. In effect,
if σ = (U, v) is a valid signature of a message m for Alice
with public key PKIDA =< XA, YA >, then
e(XA, Ppub) = e(XA, sP ) = e(sXA, P ) = e(YA, P ) (1)
r = e(U,H1(IDA)XA + YA)g−v
= e((a + v)SKIDA ,H1(IDA)x
−1
A P + x
−1
A sP )g
−v
= e((a + v)(H1(IDA) + s)−1xAP, (H1(IDA) + s)x−1A P )g
−v
= e(P, P )a+vg−v
= ga
(2)
4.2 Performance Analysis
According to the state-of-the-art results in [1] and [2],
one bilinear pairing operation requires at least 10 times
more multiplications in the underlying finite field than
an elliptic curve point scalar multiplication does in the
same finite field. In addition, most of the ID-based and
Certificateless cryptosystems require a special hash func-
tion called map-to-point hash function ([3, 4, 9, 12]) for
converting a user’s identity to a point on the underly-
ing elliptic curve. This operation is also time consuming
and cannot be treated as a conventional hash operation
which is commonly ignored in performance evaluation. A
map-to-point hash function, on the other hand, is usu-
ally implemented as a probabilistic algorithm and is more
expensive than a point scalar multiplication in terms of
computation time.
In the proposed scheme, the pairing e(P, P ) = g can
be pre-computed and published as the system parameters.
Thus, it not need to compute pairing in the Sign stage,
and it only needs to compute three pairings in the Verify
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Table 1: Performance comparison of CLS schemes
Pairing Scalar Multi Add Exponentiation MaptoPoint
Operation in G1 in G1 in G2 Operation
Sign 1 2 1 1
[9] Verify 4 0 0 1 need
Sign 0 2 0 0
[8] Verify 4 1 1 0 need
Our Sign 0 1 0 1
scheme Verify 3 1 1 0 don’t need
stage. In addition, the proposed scheme does not need the
special MaptoPoint hash function. In Table 1, we sum-
marize the number of different operations of some well-
known certificateless signature schemes and our scheme
proposed above. We ignore the time taken by conven-
tional hash operations and point addition operations as
they are much more efficient when compared with pair-
ings, scalar multiplications, and map-to-point hash oper-
ations. From Table 1, we can conclude that our scheme is
a little more efficient than Al-Riyami and Paterson’s cer-
tificateless signature scheme [9] and X. Li, K. Chen and
L. Sun’s certificateless signature scheme [8].
4.3 Security Analysis
The proposed scheme is unforgeable under the hardness
assumption of the q-strong Diffie–Hellman problem and
Computational Diffie–Hellman problem.
On the one hand, even the KGC who knows the master
key s, the partial private key of Alice, and the public key
< XA, YA > of Alice, cannot compute a valid signature.
If he can compute xA from the equalities XA = xAP or
YA = xAsP , then he can forge BLS signatures [5] which
are proven to be unforgeable based on the CDH assump-
tion.
On the other hand, any third party may try to compute
a valid signature via two ways.
• In the first place, he randomly chooses the value
U and tries to compute v such that v = H2(m ‖
e(U,H1(IDA)xA + YA)g−v) holds.
• Secondly, the adversary can choose v at random and
try to compute U such that the equation v = H2(m ‖
e(U,H1(IDA)xA + YA)g−v) holds.
However, due to the hardness of the q-strong Diffie–
Hellman problem, computational Diffie–Hellman problem
and the one-way property of cryptographic hash function,
the adversary can not forge a valid signature by this two
ways.
Theorem 1. Let us assume that there exists an adap-
tively chosen message and identity attacker z making qhi
queries to random oracles Hi(i = 1, 2) and qs queries to
the signing oracle. Assume that, within a time t, z pro-
duces a forgery with probability ε ≥ 10(qs+1)(qs+qh2)/2k.
Then, there exists an algorithm B that is able to solve the
q-SDHP for q = qh1 in an expected time
t ≤ 120686qh1qh2(t+O(qs, τp))/(ε(1−q/2k))+O(q2τmult).
(3)
where τmult and τp respectively denote the cost of a scalar
multiplication in G2 and the required time for a pairing
evaluation.
The formal security analysis is the same as Barreto
et al.’s provably-secure identity-based signatures [3], we
refer to [3] for more details.
5 Conclusions
In order to avoid the inherent escrow of identity-based
cryptography and yet not requiring certificates to guar-
antee the authenticity of public keys, Certificateless pub-
lic key cryptography was first introduced by Al-Riyami
and Paterson in Asiacrypt 2003, and has received a sig-
nificant attention in recent years. In this paper, we pro-
posed a new certificateless signature scheme based on bi-
linear pairings, the proposed scheme is more efficient than
those of previous schemes by pre-computing the pairing
e(P, P ) = g and publishing as the system parameters.
The scheme is proved to be secure under under the hard-
ness assumption of the bilinear pairing inversion problem
and Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
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